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11 Introduction
Market participation of foreign …rms is commonly believed to promote competition and e¢-
ciency. But international business transactions pose the problem of e¤ectively deterring bribing
of public o¢cials by foreign …rms. Many corrupt transactions involve companies that are incorpo-
rated in di¤erent countriesand that takeadvantage ofthedisparitiesamong national legal systems
and ofthelimited ability to enforcenational judicial rulings with foreign nationalsandcompanies.
Most countries do not prosecute domestic …rms or their executives when they are found to have
bribed foreign public o¢cials. Some countries regard bribes paid to foreign o¢cials as necessary
business expenses to produce taxable income and therefore consider them tax deductible.
In the past few years several international organizations, including the WTO, the UN, the
Council of Europe, and the OECD, have recognized the importance of this reality and have
started projects that aim to provide an e¤ective supranational framework to …ght corruption. As
an example, the OECD’s “Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public O¢cials in Inter-
national Business Transactions” isan attempt to induce individual countries to regard corruption
of foreign public o¢cial in the same terms as corruption of domestic public o¢cials. A country
that signs the Convention commits to prosecuting its …rms found to have bribed foreign public
o¢cials as if they had bribed a local public o¢cial.
The OECD Convention entered into force in February 1999. For the Convention to enter
into force it was required that it be approved by 5 of the 10 countries with the largest shares of
OECD exports, representing at least 60% of the combined total exports of those 10 countries.
By september 2001, 28 OECD member countries and 5 non-member countries had approved the
Convention. Under OECD auspices, a process of multilateral surveillance began in April 1999,
with the purpose of monitoring compliance with the Convention and assessing the steps taken by
countries to implement it in national law.1
After initial euphoria caused by the OECD Convention’s generalized approval and public
praise, mounting evidenceoflack ofenforcement hasgenerated a moredismal view in the …nancial
and business press. “When OECD member countries signed a convention in 1997 outlawing
bribery by multinational companies of o¢cials abroad, it was regarded as a milestone in the
global …ght against corruption. But …ve years later the convention is in crisis. It has produced no
prosecutions [...] In a Transparency International Survey of senior managers in emerging market
economies, conducted by Gallup International between December 2001 and March 2002, only one
in …ve respondents knew something about the convention."2 “[T]he London-based Control Risk
Group [...] found that only 56 percent of British companies, 38 percent of German and 30 of
Dutch companies were familiar with the convention. Moreover, new laws have not resulted in any
convictions."3
This paper is an attempt to provide an initial analysis of corruption in international business
transactions by studying the extent to which di¤erent international arrangements are likely to
make anti-corruption legislations enforced beyond national borders. In particular, we ask how
likely the OECD Convention is to succeed in its goal and whether a di¤erent institutional ar-
rangement may lead to superior results.
We consider a multi-country model of procurement. Each country procures one unit of a good
and the procurement process is managed by a public o¢cial. Firms active in a country may
attempt to bribe the public o¢cial in order to be awarded the procurement contract. Individual
1Information about the OECD Convention may be obtained from http://www.oecd.org.
2Eigen (2002), page 6. Peter Eigen is the Chairman of Transaparency International, an NGO dedicated to the
…ght against corruption.
3Burns (2002), page 12. Similar opinions are also found in The Economist (2002).
2countries simultaneously set the penalties that are imposed on domestic …rms that operate in the
same country and on domestic …rms operating abroad. After that, each country sets the moni-
toring intensity that determines the probability with which a corrupt transaction is discovered.
When a corrupt transaction is discovered, a penalty is imposed on the bribing …rm. When the
…rm discovered to have bribed the public o¢cial is a local …rm, the government has the ability to
enforce the penalty . But if the …rm is foreign, the penalty is not enforced unless the …rm’s home
country “cooperates” with the judicial system of the country where the illegal transaction took
place. After countries have publicly set penalties and monitoring technologies, …rms o¤er bribes
in a probabilistic auction. As a result, the contract available in any one country is awarded to
one …rm that operates in that country with a probability that depends on the bribe it o¤ered. In
this situation, we …nd, unsurprisingly, that because enforcing penalties is costly, it is a dominant
strategy for each individual country not to impose any penalties on domestic …rms bribing foreign
public o¢cials.
We then examine whether international cooperation is more likely to arise when a convention
similarto theOECD Conventionisproposed and whenindividual countries haveto simultaneously
decide whether to adhere to the Convention beforesetting penalties and monitoring probabilities.
We make use of a simple model in which countries that sign the Convention have the ability of
committing to enforce it. Thediscussion ofthe recent evidenceon theOECD Convention clari…es
that a country that signs a convention may in the end choose not to enforce it. This in turn
implies that the meaningful decision is not whether to sign the Convention or not, but rather
whether to enforce it or not. Our paper is concerned with the second decision, but for ease of
exposition, we make reference to a situation in which countries decide to sign the convention but
have the ability to commit to enforcing it.
We …nd that a convention styled after the OECD Convention may generate some degree of
international cooperation and that multiple and Pareto ranked equilibria exist. Our analysis
centers in particular on the impact of the clause that requires a minimum number of signatory
countries for the Convention to enter into force. We show that this minimum threshold may be
bene…cial, becauseit can rule out high corruption equilibria, but may also bedetrimental because,
if it is set too high, it may leave only one equilibrium in which no country signs the convention.
We …nally consider an alternative convention that stipulates that signatory countries commit
to enforcing penalties on domestic …rms which are found to have bribed the public o¢cial of
signatory countries only. We …nd that this kind of convention accomplishes two objectives. First,
it provides additional incentives to sign the convention because the bene…ts of the convention are
enjoyed only by the countries that sign it. Second, it reduces the enforcement costs that derive
from signing theconvention when few countries sign it. This reduces theincentives not to sign the
conventionwhen fewcountriesareexpected to sign andthereforemakestheemergenceofequilibria
with a reduced number of signatory countries less likely. We argue that these e¤ects make the
reciprocal convention a more appealing institutional framework than the OECD convention.
The growing international nature of corruption is an aspect that has largely been ignored by
theeconomicprofession until recently. Davis (2002) analyzestheincentivesofpayorcountries (i.e.,
countries where bribing companies are incorporated) to unilaterally proceed against their …rms
found to have bribed foreign public o¢cials. Because of its focus on corruption in procurement,
our paper is related to the existing literature on corruption in procurement and in particular to
theworks on theoptimal response of procurement mechanisms to corruption, such as La¤ont and
Tirole (1991), La¤ont and N’Guessan (1999) or Celentani and Ganuza (2002).
32 The Model
Consider N sovereign countries and N2 …rms. Firm (i; j) is incorporated in country i and
operates in country j, i = 1; :: :; N, j = 1;:: :; N. This means that N …rms operate in each
country, one locally incorporated and N ¡1 foreign, and that each country has N …rms, one that
operates in the country and N¡1 abroad.4 We choose to consider thecase ofN countries, because
thecase with 2 countries isa special onein which an important e¤ect that will bediscussed lateris
absent. The government of each country has to procure a good that can be produced at di¤erent
quality levels. For simplicity, we assume there are only two levels of quality, low and high. When
quality is low, thegovernment’s valuation of thegood is V and when it is high it is V > V. Given
that the government of country i makes decisions on behalf of country i, in the rest of the paper
we will use the two terms interchangeably.
The good to be procured by each government is purchased from any one of the N …rms that
operate in the country. All …rms are commonly known to have the same production costs. We
denote by K and K the cost of producing low and high quality, respectively, with 0 · K < K.
For the sake of simplicity, in the rest of the paper we assume that it is pro…table for governments
to procure the good at the high quality level in all equilibria. Notice that a necessary condition
for this to happen is that it is e¢cient to procure high quality, i.e., V ¡V > K¡K.
Each government delegates the execution of the procurement process to a public o¢cial who
is able to verify that the good is of high quality prior to making the payment to the supplying
…rm. Firms are risk-neutral and maximize expected pro…ts. Given that all …rms are commonly
known to have the same cost, weassume that thepublico¢cial randomly selects a …rm operating
in the country and awards it a procurement contract that requires high quality and that promises
a payment of K if the high quality good is supplied.
Any …rm can bribe the public o¢cial to be awarded the project and be illegally allowed to
supply low quality, an event we refer to as corruption. We assume that a corrupt transaction is
the result of the following probabilistic auction. Each …rm in a given country sets a nonnegative
bribe. If …rm (i; j) (incorporated in country i and operating in country j) sets bribe ¯ij ¸ 0 it





where B >0 is an exogenous parameter that measures public o¢cials’ propensity to corruption.5
A …rm (i; j) is required to pay the bribe it o¤ered, ¯ij, only if it wins the auction (only if it
succeeds in corrupting the public o¢cial of country j), i.e., only with probability ¯ij=B. Under
this probabilistic auction a …rm that bids a higher bribe has a higher probability of corrupting
the public o¢cial, but this probability is less than 1. Our way of modeling corruption is similar
to the way in which rent seeking is often modeled, but two di¤erences exist. First, we assume
that the bribe bid by each individual …rm is a promise of payment if it is awarded the contract
and that no outlay is required of …rms that have not been awarded the contract. This contrasts
with the literature on rent seeking that assumes that rent seekers’ expenditures are unconditional,
so that also losing rent seekers bear the cost of participating in the contest. Second, we assume
4To retain symmetry we want to focus on a situation in which each country has a …rm that is active in each
other country. An alternative, equivalent formulation is one in which each country only has one (multinational)
…rm that operates in all countries.
5B may include factors such as the penalty for the public o¢cial or his opportunity cost for losing his job. For
the sake of simplicity we assume that B is the same for all countries, but our results can be generalized to the case
in which the public o¢cials of di¤erent countries have di¤erent propensities to be corrupt.
4that the probability of corruption is less than 1 and we are especially interested in determining
what causes this probability to be higher or lower. By contrast, the literature on rent seeking
normally assumes that the rent is assigned with probability 1 and that an individual bidder’s
expenditure only has an impact on its own probability of being awarded the rent, but not on the
overall probability of the rent being assigned.
For the sake of simplicity, in what follows we will assume that all equilibria are interior, so
that in particular





< ¯ <1 for all j: (3)
Notice that (3) implies that in all equilibria there is probability at least 1 ¡ ¯ > 0 that no
corruption takes place. This is important, because the assumption that the government requires
high quality is justi…ed only if this probability is positive and su¢ciently high.
When …rm (i;j) bribes the public o¢cial of country j, they are discovered with probability
¹j 2 [0; 1] which is determined by the government of country j. We assume that if …rm (i;j) is
found to have bribed the public o¢cial of country j, it receives a nonmonetary penalty ¼ij which
is determined by the government of country i, the country where the …rm is incorporated. This
assumption is meant to recognize that each country has very limited ability to enforce penalties
on …rms incorporated in foreign countries, unless these foreign countries cooperate. We assume
that only two possible levels for penalties exist, ¼ij 2 f0;¼g with ¼ij = ¼ > 0 meaning that
…rm (i; j) is penalized by country i and ¼ij = 0 meaning that …rm (i; j) is not penalized by
country i. Our description should be regarded as a stylized representation of a situation in which
enforcement ofpenaltiesagainst foreign…rmsand theirexecutivesislesse¤ectivethanenforcement
of a penalty against a domestic…rm and its executives. Theassumption that without cooperation
of the country where the …rm is incorporated the penalty is 0 is without loss of generality. Our
qualitative results would be the same with nonzero but lower e¤ective deterrence for foreign …rm.





where M > 0 is an exogenous parameter. We also assume that if country i prosecutes …rm (i; j)
























denote the probability of corruption in country i.





















The…rst two termsrefer to theexpected net utility ofprocuring the good. With probability 1¡°i
there is no corruption. In this case the good is of high quality, it is worth V to the government,
and the payment to the supplier is K. With probability °i there is corruption. In this case the
good is of low quality, it isworth V to the government and the payment to the supplier is K. The
third term represents the cost to government i ofsetting a monitoring probability equal to ¹i. The
last term represents the cost to the government of country i of prosecuting domestic …rms that
operate in the country or abroad. The cost of prosecuting …rm (i; j) (i.e., setting ¼ij = ¼) is P
multiplied by theprobability that …rm (i;j) is involved in a corrupt transaction which is uncovered
in country j, °ij¹j. Notice that we ignore the cost of prosecuting (successfully or unsuccessfully)
foreign …rms that operatein the country, because these costs are likely to be considerablebut are
inessential for the purposes of the paper.6
In the following we will …nd it useful to view the payo¤sto the government of any one country
as the bene…ts of procurement, BPi(°),
















Summarizing we can express the utility function of the government of country i as:
Gi(¹;¼; °) =BPi(¹;¼;°) ¡MCi(¹;¼;°) ¡ECi(¹;¼; °):
The preferences of …rm (i; j) are represented by the following utility function









In words, if …rm (i;j) is not involved in a corrupt transaction, it makes zero pro…t. If it is, an
event which happens with probability °ij =
¯ij





pays out bribe ¯ij to the public o¢cial of country j, and it su¤ers an expected penalty equal to
¹j¼ij
We summarize the extensive form of the game through the following time sequence:
² Stage 1 (penalties): The governments of all countries announce contests to procure high
quality goods and publicly set penalties for corruption. Government i sets (¼ij)N
j=1.






and choose monitoring probabilities. Government i sets ¹i.
6Taking these costs into account would recognize an additional source of externality. When a country prosecutes
its …rms abroad, it reduces the probability that they are involved in corrupt transactions and therefore bene…ts
foreign countries by reducing their expected prosecution costs.







and choose ¯ij ¸ 0.
² Stage 4 (outcomes and payo¤s): In each country i = 1;: :: ;N the public o¢cial is bribed
by …rm (i; j) with probability °ij =
¯ij
B , j =1; :: :; N. In this case …rm (i;j) is awarded the
procurement project, produces a low quality good, is reimbursed for the high quality good,
and pays out bribe ¯ij to the public o¢cial. With probability ¹i the corrupt agreement is
uncovered and penalty ¼ij is imposed on the …rm.
With probability 1 ¡°i the public o¢cial of country i is not bribed by any …rm. In this
case, the public o¢cial randomly awards the project to any …rm (i; j), j =1;: :: ;N. Firm
(i;j) produces a high quality good and is reimbursed its cost.
We denoteby ¡ the game de…ned by theprevious extensive form. For thesakeofsimplicity in
the following we will focus on parameter constellations such that SPNE outcomes are all interior,
i.e., ¹i 2 (0; 1), °ij 2 (0; 1), °i 2 (0;1), for all i and all j. Notice that this is always the case





We now want to justify the way in which we model corruption and in particular the choice
of endogenizing corruption probabilities through the probabilistic auction described above. First,
note that our main goal is to study how di¤erent deterrence mechanisms endow private parties
with di¤erent incentives to engage in corrupt transactions. Recall that the probabilistic auction
we propose implies that …rms which o¤erhigher bribeshavea higher probability ofcorrupting the
public o¢cial, but that any …rm that bids a positive bribe has a positive probability of corrupting
the public o¢cial. Given that …rms with higher expected gains from corruption …nd it optimal to
o¤er higher bribes, the probabilistic auction
1. Takes into account that …rms with higher incentives to engage in corrupt transactions are
more likely to corrupt a public o¢cial.
2. Recognizes that any …rm with a positive expected gain from corruption has a positive
probability of succeeding in corrupting the public o¢cial.
Property 1 seems uncontroversial in that it conveys the idea that corruptors’ willingness to
pay is important. Property 2 states that the public o¢cial may strike a deal with a …rm that
is not the one willing to pay the highest bribe. We believe that property 2 is appealing for
the following reason. Corrupt arrangements are illegal and therefore face signi…cant and varying
transaction costs arising from asymmetric information and the absence of legal commitments.
This may ultimately lead to a corrupt transaction with a …rm di¤erent from the one that can
generate the highest surplus and is therefore willing to pay the highest bribe. For example,
existing communication networks and established reputations may reduce transaction costs with
some selected …rms and may make an agreement with these …rms more likely, regardless of their
expected gains from corruption.
The probabilistic auction should be regarded as a reduced form that describes how di¤erent
incentives to engage in corrupt transactions translate into corruption probabilities. We believe
that resorting to a reduced form model is appropriate, because corruption can be organized in a
7wide variety of di¤erent ways, and any detailed description of the process that leads to a corrupt
agreement is bound to be incomplete and may lead to unreasonable predictions.7
Before concluding it is also important to underline that our probabilistic auction implies that
the probability of any one …rm succeeding in bribing the public o¢cial depends only on the bribe
it promises and on B, the propensity of the public o¢cial to become corrupt (see equation (1)).
In other words the probability of a …rm succeeding in bribing the public o¢cial is independent
of the bribes which are promised by the other …rms.8 This simpli…es the analysis because …rms
have dominant strategies in the bribe setting game of stage 3. But it is also useful to underline
that the results of the paper would be unchanged in a more general environment in which the
probability of a …rm bribing the public o¢cial also depends on the bribes of competing …rms. For











with l 2 [0; 1) and °ij 2 [0; 1]; notice that (1) is a special case of (6) in which l = 0. With this
speci…cation, which is reminiscent of models of yardstick competition, if …rm (i;j) chooses a bribe
that gives it a positive probability of succeeding in bribing the public o¢cial of country j, this
probability is increasing in its own bribe and increasing in the di¤erence between its own bribe
and the average bribe. This implies that theprobability of succeeding in bribing thepublic o¢cial
is decreasing in the bribes bid by competing …rms.9
3 The Basic Game: Free Riding
This section studies subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of ¡. We start by analyzing
individual …rms’ play at stage 3.









; i =1; :: :;N, j = 1;: :: ;N (7)
Proof. Appendix.
Lemma 1 states that each …rm (i; j) bids a bribe that is proportional to the value of the
corrupt agreement minus its expected penalty. From Lemma 1, the probability that the…rm (i; j)

























7As mentioned above, the literature on rent seeking also views the allocation of rents as deriving from contest
success functions that have desirable properties such as that the probability of a rent seeker being assigned the rent
is higher when he expends more resources in the contest.
8We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the importance of justifying this assumption.
9Appendix B analyzes the bribing game in which the probability of succeeding in bribing the public o¢cial is as
in (6).





denote the sum of penalties imposed by foreign governments on the respective foreign …rms oper-
ating in country i.














¢ i =1; :: :; N (10)
Proof. Appendix.
Lemma 2 showsthat in stage2, themonitoring intensity chosen by the government of country
i is increasing in V ¡ V, the value of deterring corruption, increasing in ¼Fi the sum of the
penalties faced by the foreign …rms operating in the country, and decreasing in K¡K, the value
of a corrupt agreement to the corrupt parties.
The following Proposition characterizes the path of the SPNE of ¡.
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Proposition 1 states that in a SPNE of ¡ the government of each country i sets a positive
penalty on …rm (i;i), the domestically incorporated …rm that operates in the country, ¼¤
ii = ¼> 0.
The government of country i …nds this optimal because a positive penalty on …rm (i;i) decreases
theprobability that the …rm bribes thepublico¢cial and thereforedecreasesthe total probability
that the local public o¢cial is involved in a corrupt transaction. On the other hand, given that
imposing a penalty on…rm (i;j), j 6=i, is costly to the government of country i but bene…cial only
for country j, no government imposes penalties on domestically incorporated …rms that operate
abroad, i.e., for all i = 1; :: :; N, ¼ij = 0, 8j 6= i. Given that a positive penalty on …rm (i;i)
makes monitoring valuable, in a SPNE thegovernment ofeach country i sets a positive monitoring
probability that is such that the marginal value of deterring corruption of …rm (i; i) is equal to
the marginal cost of monitoring.
From Proposition 1, the probability that a public o¢cial is bribed by an arbitrary foreign
…rm is higher than the probability that he is bribed by the domestic …rm, °ij > °ii, because
foreign …rms face lower expected penalties and therefore …nd it optimal to o¤er higher bribes.
This implies that in the stylized setting described in this paper an easy if partial remedy against
9corruption would be to require that the procurement contract always be awarded to the domestic
…rm. This result is an arti…cial consequence of some simplifying assumptions we make and in
particular:
1. Firms do not have private information about their costs or other possibly relevant parame-
ters, such as their quality. Thisimplies that competition playsno rolein achieving e¢ciency
and in reducing the expected procurement cost.
2. A bribeof a given amount is equally likely to succeed in bribing thepublico¢cial regardless
of whether it is o¤ered by a domestic or a foreign …rm. This implies that we do not
recognize that local …rms are normally more e¤ective in establishing the connections with
public o¢cials and we therefore underestimate the probability that they are involved in a
corrupt transaction.10
In other words, we share the common views that participation of foreign …rms promotes
competition and leads to e¢ciency gains and that, ceteris paribus, domestic …rms are more likely
to succeed in bribing the public o¢cial. For these reasons we believe that it is desirable to
allow foreign bidders to participate in competitive procurement mechanisms. But to retain the
analysis tractable, rather than proposing a model in which it is optimal to allow foreign …rms to
participate, we simply assume that they are allowed, even if they are subject to a less e¤ective
penalty scheme.11 The focus of our paper is on how to rein in foreign …rms’ propensities to bribe
public o¢cials.
4 The Impact of Conventions on International Bribery
The previous section serves to make the point that it is costly for the government of country i
to impose penalties on its …rms that operate abroad and that the bene…cial e¤ects deriving from
corruption deterrence are enjoyed only by foreign countries. As a consequence no such penalties
are imposed in equilibrium.
This section studies international conventions designed to deter international corruption by
requiring countries to impose penalties on their …rms operating abroad. Before turning to this
analysis we …rst wish to study the consequences of setting penalties on …rms operating abroad.











Corollary 1 states that when ¼Fi, the sum of the penalties faced by foreign …rms in country
i, is higher, the government of country i …nds it optimal to increase the monitoring intensity,
10This assumption has been made, among others, by La¤ont and Tirole (1991) who provide several examples of
favoritism towards domestic …rms in international trade.
11For an analysis of bribing and procurement in asymmetric information settings, see La¤ont and Tirole (1991)
and Celentani and Ganuza (2002).
10because the larger penalties increase marginal deterrence and therefore make monitoring more
valuable at the margin. Corollary 1 also states that an increase in ¼Fi leads to a reduction in
corruption in country i. This deterrence arises for two reasons. First, increasing penalties has a
direct e¤ect becauseit makes bribing more costly in expected terms. Second, larger penalties lead
to higher monitoring intensities, and this reinforces the increase in the expected penalty. Finally,
Corollary 1 states that if the government of a country j imposes penalties on its …rm operating
in country i 6= j it creates positive externalities on country i.
In the following we introduce a class of conventions inspired by the OECD “Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public O¢cials in International Business Transactions”
Definition 1 Convention U (¿), ¿ = 1;: :: ;N: If a country signs the Convention and the Con-
vention enters into force, the country commits to imposing the same penalty on all domestically
incorporated …rms found to have bribed a public o¢cial regardless of the country where the public
o¢cial is based. The Convention enters into force only if the number of signatory countries is
greater than or equal to the threshold ¿.
Note that we denote this type of Convention by U (¿) to underline that the Convention is
unilateral in the sense that a signatory country commits to prosecuting its …rms bribing public
o¢cials of any foreign country, regardless of whether these countries reciprocate or not. As in
the OECD Convention, under this kind of Convention, countries are allowed to choose their
monitoring e¤orts, but they are required to enforce uniform penalties on domestic …rmsthat have
been found to have bribed public o¢cials of any country. In other words, signatory countries
commit to equating penalties for bribing domestic and foreign public o¢cials. Focusing on this
type of conventions implicitly recognizes that it may be very di¢cult to verify monitoring e¤orts,
but that it is easier to verify whether countries enforce penalties on domestic…rms that are found
to have bribed foreign public o¢cials.
Inthefollowing wewill focusonthegamein which individual countries, beforesetting penalties
and monitoring probabilities, decide whether to sign a given convention C = U (¿), ¿ =1; :: :; N,
that constrains their subsequent choices.
Definition 2 Let ¡(C) be the game in which the government of individual countries simultane-
ously decide at stage 0 whether to sign Convention C and then play as in ¡, with the possible
restrictions that having signed Convention C may entail. Preferences for all players are inherited
from ¡.
Notice that in ¡(C) Convention C is given. This means that countries cannot propose or agree
on a convention di¤erent from C, but can only decideat stage0 whetherthey sign Convention C or
not. We focus on this game because we are interested in analyzing individual countries’ reactions
to given conventions, rather than predicting what conventions are likely to be proposed. In other
words the prime objective of this paper is a normative rather than a positive analysis.
To analyze the SPNE of ¡(C) we proceed backward and start from …rms’ bidding strategies
in stage 3. Note that in a SPNE of ¡ (C) the bribe o¤ered by any one …rm depends on whether a
convention is in forceor not only because theconvention may havean impact on thepenalties and
the monitoring probabilities set by governments in stages 1 and 2. In other words …rms’ SPNE
bidding strategies in stage 3 of ¡(C) are identical to the SPNE bidding strategies in ¡ and are
therefore characterized by Lemma 1.
A similar argument applies to monitoring probabilities set by individual countries in stage 2
of ¡ (C), and SPNE monitoring probabilities are therefore still characterized by Lemma 2. Notice
11in particular that, because by Lemma 2 a country’s monitoring probability depends only on
the sum of the penalties on the …rms active in the country, when a convention is in force all
signatory countries will choose the same monitoring probability and all nonsignatory countries
will choose a higher one. To see this, notice that if n countries sign Convention U (¿) and the
Convention enters into force (i.e., n ¸¿), a non-signatory country facesn signatory countries, but
a signatory country only n¡1. It is important to remark that while nonsignatory countries have
higher monitoring probabilities, the monitoring probability of a given country does not depend
on whether the country signs the Convention or not. In other words, if a nonsignatory country
decides to deviate and sign the Convention, its monitoring probability is una¤ected whereas the
monitoring probabilities of all other countries increase.
Under a Convention U (¿), stage 1 SPNE strategies are very easily characterized. When
at least ¿ countries sign the Convention in stage 0, in stage 1 signatory countries set positive
penalties for all their …rms, regardless of whether they operate in the home country or abroad,
and each nonsignatory country sets a positive penalty only for the domestic …rm that operates
in the country. When less than ¿ countries sign the Convention at stage 0, each country sets a
positive penalty only for the domestic …rm that operates in the country.
In the next Proposition we make use of the previous results and move to the characterization
of SPNE strategies in stage 0. Rather than presenting the results for Conventions U (¿), ¿ =
1; :: :; N, we focus our attention on Convention U (N) in particular, because it has a special
interest for our analysis. For the sake of completeness we will brie‡y summarize the results for
Conventions U (¿), ¿ =1; :: :; N ¡1 at the end of the present section.
Proposition 2 In ¡(U (N)) there is a unique SPNE in which all N countries sign the Conven-
tion.
Proof. Appendix.
Proposition 2 clari…es that when ¿ = N each country becomes pivotal to the Convention
entering into force. Thisimplies that when considering a possibledeviation from a pro…lein which
all N countriessign Convention U (N), each country compares thesituation in which all countries
penalize their …rms abroad with one in which none does. Given the symmetry in the model, the
assumption that guarantees that each country sets a positive penalty for the domestic …rm that
operates in the country also ensures that the bene…t deriving from a Convention undersigned by
all N countriesis at least as large astheenforcement cost that each country has to bearfor signing
it. Therefore, a unilateral deviation from the pro…le in which all N countries sign the Convention
is not pro…table.
An implication of Proposition 2 is that a unilateral Convention that enters into force only
if all N countries sign it, will lead to all countries signing the Convention and therefore to the
Conventionentering into force. InthissenseProposition 2suggeststhat thereisaneasy solutionto
theproblem ofinternational corruption. In therest ofthissection wearguethat thisinterpretation
is overly optimistic because the result of Proposition 2 is not robust.
Proposition 2 may be regarded as making two separate statements:
1. Convention U (N) makes each country pivotal and therefore endows individual countries
with incentives to sign.
2. Because all countries have incentives to sign the Convention, the Convention enters into
force.
12Suppose that the payo¤s of individual countries are not exactly as speci…ed in the model,
but that each individual country may have an idiosyncratic disposition to sign the Convention.
A country inclined to sign derives an excess payo¤ from signing that is larger than the excess
bene…ts of procurement, minus the excess monitoring cost, minus the excess enforcement cost. A
country inclined not to sign derives an excess payo¤ from signing that is lower than the excess
bene…ts of procurement, minus the excess monitoring cost, minus the excess enforcement cost.
Introducing these idiosyncratic e¤ects seems reasonable for several reasons. First, our simple
model does not take into account asymmetries that may endow di¤erent countries with di¤erent
incentives to sign. Second, the model does not acknowledge either the fact that the governments
of some countries are involved in corrupt transaction and are therefore all but keen to witness
the failure of any attempt to curb international corruption. Finally, the model also ignores the
fact that governments that commit to penalizing bribery of foreign public o¢cials may receive a
bene…t for a variety of reasons that range from pure altruism to gains deriving from signaling its
resolve to …ght corruption, and from an improved international status to more generous access to
loans from the World Bank or the IMF.
When these idiosyncratic e¤ects are recognized, Convention U (N) still maximizes the incen-
tives of individual countries to sign, but it provides no guarantee that all countries will end up
signing and, therefore, that theConvention will enter into force. In other words, weare persuaded
by Proposition 2’s contention that making each country pivotal creates some incentives to sign.
But webelievethat its prediction that all countries will sign isnot robust. For thisreason, therest
of the paper is dedicated to an analysis of the impact of conventions on international corruption
when individual countries have idiosyncratic propensities to sign a convention.
Before turning to an explicit analysis of the consequences of idiosyncratic payo¤ functions,
we want to give a brief discussion of the extension of the result of Proposition 2 to Conventions
U (¿), ¿ = 1; :: :; N ¡1. In a SPNE under Convention U (¿), ¿ = 1; :: :; N ¡1, no more than
¿ countries will sign the Convention. In particular, if ¿ is high enough in all SPNE of ¡(U (¿))
exactly ¿ countriessign the Convention. Thisis thecasebecauseeach of the¿ signatory countries
is pivotal to the Convention entering into force and because with a high ¿ a signatory country’s
bene…ts of procurement deriving from the fact that ¿ ¡ 1 foreign countries penalize their …rms
operating abroad are su¢cient to compensate the increase in the enforcement costs that the
signatory country bears for signing the Convention. When ¿ is low, in all SPNE of ¡(U (¿))
exactly ¿ ¡ 1 countries sign the Convention. This is the case because each of the N ¡ ¿ + 1
nonsignatory countries is pivotal to the Convention not entering into force and …nds it optimal
not to deviate and sign because with a low ¿ the bene…ts of procurement deriving from the fact
that ¿¡1 foreign countries penalize their …rms operating abroad are not su¢cient to compensate
the increase in the enforcement costs that signing the Convention and causing it enter into force
would entail.
The previous discussion illustrates that in a simple game such as ¡(U (¿)) there are obvious
gains in making ¿ as high as possible. This is the reason we chose to focus our analysis on U (N).
The goal of the rest of the paper is to show that the introduction of idiosyncratic components in
the inclination to sign a convention leads to dramatic changes.
5 Unilateral Conventions and Idiosyncratic Preferences
In this section we allow the preferences of countries to di¤er from Gi(¹;¼;°). Let ¾i 2 fY;Ng
denote the action of signing (¾i = Y ) or not (¾i =N) the Convention for country i at stage 0.
Definition 3 Let ¡ (®;C) be the game in which Nature publicly draws ®= (®1;: :: ;®N) 2 RN at
13stage ¡1, the governments of individual countries simultaneously decide at stage 0 whether to sign
Convention C and then play as in ¡, with the possible restrictions that having signed Convention C
may entail. Preferences for …rms are inherited from ¡. Governments’ preferences are represented
by:
e Gi(¾;¹; ¼; °) =
½
Gi(¹;¼; °) if ¾i =N
Gi(¹;¼; °) +®i if ¾i =Y
:
Notice that, as in ¡(C), in ¡(®; C) Convention C is given. This means that countries cannot
propose di¤erent conventions but can only decide whether to sign Convention C at stage 0 of the
game. In game ¡ (®;C), the act of signing the Convention gives each individual government i an
additive and idiosyncraticextra utility of ®i 2 R that doesnot depend on whether other countries
have signed or not the Convention and in particular on whether the Convention enters into force
or not. Notice that ®i can be positive, negative, or zero. Without loss of generality we index
countries so that ®1 ¸®2 ¸: :: ¸ ®N.
We now want to discuss some preliminary results that will be useful for the characterization
of the SPNE of ¡ (®;C). In particular we are interested in analyzing the impact of the decision to
sign a Convention on the enforcement costs borne by a signatory country. To do this we need to
analyze the changes in the continuation play and continuation utilities that may derive from an
individual country’s deviation from a given stage 0 action pro…le.
Considera subgame starting at stage 1 aftera total ofn ¸ ¿ countries havesigned Convention
U (¿) at stage 0. In a SPNE of this subgame signatory countries set penalties for all their …rms
and nonsignatory countries set penalties only for their …rms operating domestically. Consider
now stage 2 and denote by ¹S¤ and ¹NS¤ the SPNE monitoring probabilities in a signatory and
nonsignatory country, respectively. Similarly, let °S¤
¡i and °NS¤
¡i denote the SPNE probability that
a …rm incorporated in country i is involved in a corrupt transaction in a foreign signatory or
nonsignatory country, respectively.
Thefollowing Lemma characterizesthereductionin enforcement costs that asignatory country
i could achieve by deviating and not signing the Convention.
Lemma 3 Consider ¡ (®;U (¿)) and an action pro…le at stage 0 in which n ¸ ¿ countries (in-
cluding country i) sign Convention U (¿). The reduction in enforcement costs that country i could








The enforcement costs deriving from signing Convention U (¿) depend on thenumberof signa-
tory countries, n, because signing the Convention implies an enforcement cost for country i that
dependson the expected number ofcorruption casesthat areuncovered. Given that thisexpected
number is equal to the probability of corruption times the monitoring probability, it depends on
the number of signatory countries, as the latter a¤ects both probabilities of corruption and mon-
itoring probabilities. DECi(n) in Lemma 3 describes the magnitude of enforcement cost savings
government i would attain by deviating from a pro…le in which it signs Convention U (¿) together
with n¡1 other countries. Notice that the enforcement cost savings depend on the number of
the other countries that penalize bribing of foreign public o¢cials. However, they depend on the
speci…c Convention only to the extent that they are di¤erent from 0 so long as n ¸ ¿; but are
otherwise independent of ¿.
Consider now a pro…le with n > ¿ signatory countries. For that to be part of a SPNE of
¡ (®;U (¿)) it is necessary and su¢cient that neither signatory nor nonsignatory countries prefer
14to deviate. If a signatory country deviates, it loses ®i and it saves on enforcement costs, but
its bene…ts of procurement and monitoring costs in the continuation game are una¤ected. For a
signatory country not to want to deviate, we therefore need, ®i ¸ DECi(n). If a nonsignatory
country deviates, it receives ®j and it has increased enforcement costs, but its bene…ts of procure-
ment and monitoring costs in the continuation game are una¤ected. For a nonsignatory country
not to prefer a deviation, we therefore need, ®j <DECj (n+1).
The previous discussion clari…es that DECi(n) has a prominent impact on the SPNE of
¡ (®;U (¿)) and its properties. We therefore turn to its characterization. To simplify the presen-
tation, in the following we will consider the extension of DECi(n) to R+. The following Lemma
characterizes an important property of DECi(n).
Lemma 4 DECi(n) is a concave quadratic function of n, if N ¸3
Proof. Appendix.
Lemma 4 lies at the heart of our main results and therefore deserves careful discussion. Note
that Lemma 4 implies that DECi(n) may have an increasing portion. This means that it is
possible that adding one signatory country to the Convention may imply a negative externality
on the current signatory countries, in the sense that it causes enforcement costs of signatory
countries to increase. This may seem surprising, because it means that the participation of an
additional country in a Convention may generatea negative externality. To seewhy this negative
externality may occur, considerthecasein whichtherearethreecountries. Supposethat country 1
plans to signConvention U (1) and consider its enforcement costs when it is theonly signatory and
when country 2 signs as well. From Corollary 1 we know that the e¤ect of country 2 prosecuting
its …rms in country 1 is bene…cial to the government of country 1.
Considernow the consequenceson country 1 of country 2 prosecuting its …rm active in country
3, …rm (2;3). By Corollary 1, country 3 …nds it optimal to respond by augmenting the proba-
bility with which any local corrupt transaction is discovered. But the increase in the monitoring
probability in country 3 has two di¤erent repercussions on theprobability that …rm (1;3) is found
to have bribed the public o¢cial of country 3. First, it creates additional deterrence. Second,
it increases the probability with which a corrupt transaction is discovered. The …rst e¤ect tends
to decrease the probability that …rm (1; 3) is found to have bribed the public o¢cial of country
3, because it decreases the probability that bribing occurs. The second e¤ect tends to increase
the probability that …rm (1; 3) is found to have bribed the public o¢cial of country 3, because it
increases the probability with which bribing is discovered if it occurs.
Given that the two e¤ects have di¤erent signs, the net e¤ect on the probability that …rm
(1;3) is found to have bribed the public o¢cial of country 3 may be to decrease or increase it.
Because the enforcement costs are increasing in this probability, country 1’s enforcement costs
may increase or decrease when country 2 signs the Convention. Note that the e¤ect discussed
above arises only if there are at least 3 countries and this is the reason why we chose to consider
a case with N countries rather than a simpler model with only 2 countries.
We now want to investigate when the gains from deviating and not signing a convention that
derive from the savings in enforcement costs are maximal. We de…ne
º = argmax DECi(n):
n2f1;:::;Ng
Notice that º is not necessarily a singleton because DECi(n) is a concave quadratic function in n
and therefore there may be two values ofn 2 f1; :: :; Ng that attain the maximum. Consider now
a pro…lein which ncountries signConvention U (1) at stage0. Ifasignatory country deviatesfrom
15such a pro…le, its enforcement cost savings are maximal when n 2 º: Given that º characterizes
theaction pro…lesat stage 0 from which an individual deviation generates thelargest enforcement
cost savings, it will prove useful to discuss the incentives individual governments have to deviate
from a given action pro…le at stage 0.
5.1 Equilibria with Convention U (1)
Under Convention U (1) a signatory country commits to penalizing its …rms found to have
bribed the public o¢cials of all foreign countries and regardless of the number of other countries
signing the Convention. Convention U (1) di¤ers from the OECD Convention but it constitutes a
useful benchmark and a useful reference to discussConventions U (¿), ¿ >1, that will be analyzed
in the next subsection. The next Proposition characterizes SPNE under Convention U(1).
Proposition 3 Consider ¡(®; U (1)).
1. A SPNE of ¡ (®;U (1)) always exists.
2. There may be at most one SPNE with minº or fewer signatory countries.
3. There may be multiple SPNE with min º +1 or more signatory countries.
Proof. Appendix.
Proposition 3 says that in the case in which an individual country’s enforcement cost savings
DECi(n) monotonically increasewith n (i.e., when min º =N), a uniqueSPNE exists. To see this
suppose that two SPNE exist, the …rst with N0 and the second with N00 >N0 signatory countries.
Because of the symmetry of the model, in the …rst SPNE the N0 countries with the highest ®’s
sign the Convention, and all the other countries do not. By the same argument, in the second
SPNE the N00 countries with the highest ®’s sign the Convention, and all the other countries do
not. This means that countries i =N0 +1; ::: ;N00 sign the Convention in the …rst SPNE but not
in the second. Noting that the the enforcement cost savings are larger in the second SPNE than
in the …rst, leads to a contradiction.
When a signatory country’s reduction in enforcement costs deriving from deviating and not
signing, DECi(n), monotonically decrease with n (i.e., when minº = 1), the previous argument
cannot be applied. When DECi(n) monotonically decreases with n, instead, the fact that an
additional country signs Convention U (1) reduces the excess enforcement costs that any country
has to bear for signing the Convention. This generates a strategic complementarity and leads to
emergence of multiple SPNE.
When a signatory country’s enforcement cost savings from deviating, DECi(n), arenot mono-
tonic in n (i.e., when 1 < minº < N), by Lemma 4, DECi(n) is increasing for n · min º and
decreasing for n ¸ min º +1. By Proposition 3, the arguments used in the previous cases can
be applied separately to the increasing and the decreasing portion of DECi(n). This implies that
there can be no more than one SPNE in the increasing portion of DECi(n), but there may be
multiple SPNE in the decreasing portion.
The following Proposition states that SPNE with larger numbers ofsignatory countries Pareto
dominate SPNE with a lower number of signatory countries.
Proposition 4 Suppose that ¡ (®;U (1)) has two SPNE, one with N0 and one with N00 > N0
signatory countries. Then the SPNE with N00 Pareto dominates the SPNE with N0 signatory
countries.
16Ratherthan providing a formal proofofProposition 4 in thefollowing weprovideitsintuition.
First, notice that all countries that do not sign in either SPNE are strictly bettero¤in the second
SPNE than in the…rst, becausethey donot bearany enforcement costsandbecausethebene…tsof
procurement they enjoy arelarger when a larger number ofcountries sign the Convention. Second,
countries that sign the convention in the second equilibrium (with N00 signatory countries) but
not in the …rst (with N0 signatory countries), receive a higher utility in the second equilibrium
than in the …rst. To see why this is the case, notice that if such a country were to deviate
from a pro…le with N00 signatory countries, it would get higher utility than in the SPNE with
N0 signatory countries, because its bene…ts of procurement would be higher than in that case.12
Given that the utility in the SPNE has to be at least as large as the utility from any deviation,
the result follows. Finally, turn to countries that sign the Convention in both SPNE. Given that
additional countries with lower idiosyncratic utilities sign the Convention in the second SPNE,
the enforcement costs in the second SPNE are smaller. Noticing that thebene…ts of procurement
are higher in the equilibrium with more signatory countries concludes the argument.
5.2 Equilibria Under the OECD Convention
We now turn to a characterization of SPNE under Conventions U (¿), ¿ > 1. This analysis is
useful for two reasons. First, Convention U (¿), ¿ > 1, gives a stylized description of the OECD
Convention (which includes a clause requiring that a minimum number of countries, representing
a minimum percentageof OECD export sign it beforeit entersinto force) and thereforeprovides a
framework to think about the OECD Convention’s likely impact. Second, a comparison of SPNE
under Convention U (1) and under Conventions U (¿), ¿ > 1, makes it possible to analyze the
advantages and disadvantages of introducing a minimum threshold ¿ > 1.
Notice …rst that the equivalents of Propositions 3 and 4 hold for ¡(®; U (¿)). In other words
¡ (®;U (¿)) always has a SPNE, it may have multiple SPNE, and in case of SPNE multiplicity,
SPNE with a higher number of signatory countries Pareto dominate SPNE with a lower number
of signatory countries. The proofs are straightforward extensions of the previous results and are,
therefore, omitted.
We now want to make comparisons between SPNE under Conventions U (1), and U (¿), ¿ > 1.
For this purpose we …nd it useful to de…ne the following set of idiosyncratic utilities
A(U (¿); n) =
©
® 2 RN : there exists a SPNE of ¡ (®;U (¿)) with at least n signatory countries
ª
:
Proposition 5 Consider ¡(®; U (1)) and ¡ (®;U (¿)) for ¿ >1.
1. A(U (1);¿) ½ A(U (¿);¿) and, for ¿ < n, A(U (1);n) = A(U(¿); n).
2. A(U (1);1)nA(U (¿); ¿) 6=?:
Proof. Appendix.
Parts 1 and 2 of Proposition 5 reveal that introducing a threshold ¿ > 1 may have an upside
and a downside, respectively.
Part 1 states …rst that there exist vectors of idiosyncratic utilities such that ¡(®; U (¿)) has
a SPNE with at least ¿ signatory countries and such that ¡ (®;U (1)) has no such SPNE. This
is true because under Convention U (¿) a signatory country’s deviation from a pro…le with ¿
signatory countries leads to a reduction in the bene…ts of procurement, because each of the ¿
12This is true so long as N
00 > N
0 +1, a condition that is easily shown to hold.
17signatory countries is pivotal to the Convention entering into force. Given that this loss does not
occur under Convention U (1), the incentives to deviate under Convention U(¿) are fewer than
under Convention U (1) and the result follows.13
Part 1 also states that the set of idiosyncratic utilities such that there exists a SPNE with
at least n signatory countries is the same under Convention U (1) as under Convention U (¿),
if the threshold is strictly lower than n. This means that all SPNE with n signatory countries
under Convention U (1) arealso SPNE when a threshold ¿ <n is introduced. In other words, the
introduction of a threshold ¿ < n does not make a SPNE with n signatory countries more likely
in the sense that the sets of idiosyncratic utilities which guarantee that such a SPNE exists under
the two Conventions are identical.
Summarizing, part 1 says that the introduction of a threshold ¿ is bene…cial to support a
SPNE with exactly ¿ signatory countries, but is otherwise useless.
Part 2 states that there are®’s that are such that a SPNE with a positivenumber ofsignatory
countries exists under U (1) and also such that under U(¿) there is no SPNE in which the
Convention enters into force. This means that there are values of ® for which the introduction
of a minimum threshold leads from a convention entering into force with a possibly limited but
positive number of signatory countries to a convention that does not enter into force. Notice
also that the same result can be shown to apply to the comparison of SPNE under two di¤erent
thresholds, ¿0 and ¿00, with 1 · ¿0 < ¿00 · N. In other words, increasing the threshold is always
risky in that it may lead to the convention not entering into force.
Our interpretation of Proposition 5 is that introducing a minimum threshold that has to be
met beforea Conventionentersintoforceisa sensiblerequirement that may turn out to beharmful
when it is set in ignorance of possible idiosyncratic components of individual countries’ inclina-
tions to sign a convention against bribery in international business transactions. In particular,
a threshold is useful when it makes every signatory country pivotal. But setting an ambitiously
high threshold may lead to a situation in which there is no SPNE in which the Convention enters
into force.
6 An Alternative Convention: The Impact of Reciprocity
Convention R proposes an alternative institutional design to combat corruption in interna-
tional business transactions.
Definition 4 Convention R: If a country signs the Convention , the country commits to impose
the same penalty on all domestically incorporated …rms found to have bribed public o¢cials of all
other signatory countries.
Compared to theunilateral conventions analyzed in the previous section, Convention R makes
use of the possibility of excluding countries from the bene…cial e¤ects of the international …ght
against bribing of foreign public o¢cials, unless they actively contribute to this …ght. Under
Convention U (¿), if country i decides not to sign, it loses idiosyncratic utility ®i and it saves
on enforcement costs. When n = ¿, moreover, a deviation also leads to the loss deriving from
the reduction in the bene…ts of procurement. Under Convention R, if country i decides not to
sign, there are two important novel e¤ects. First, if country i does not sign Convention R, it
saves on enforcement costs, but the savings are smaller than under Convention U (¿), in the
13Notice that part 1 also claims that if ® 2 A(U (1);¿) then ® 2 A(U (¿); ¿). This result is also an immediate
consequence of the fact that the incentive to deviate from a pro…le with ¿ signatory countries are larger under U (1)
than under U (¿).
18event in which not all foreign countries sign the Convention. This derives from the fact that
Convention R requires penalizing bribing of public o¢cials of signatory countries only. Given
that this leads to lower enforcement costs, the savings deriving from not signing are smaller.
Second, if country i decides not to sign Convention R, it loses the bene…cial e¤ects deriving from
signatory countries’ commitment to penalize their own …rms operating in country i, because this
penalization is conditional on country i also signing the Convention. As was stated in Corollary 1
the utility of the government of country i is increasing in the sum of penalties imposed by foreign
countries on their …rms operating in country i, @Gi=@¼Fi > 0.
The previous discussion clari…es that Convention R provides the governments of individual
countries additional incentives to sign when they believe that not all countries are likely to sign.
This is because Convention R creates a direct bene…cial e¤ect of signing and it reduces the cost
savings from not signing when less than full participation is expected, i.e., in the cases in which
signing the Convention is likely to generate high costs and reduced bene…ts.
In the following we analyze the consequences on governments’ behavior of the incentives cre-
ated by Convention R: We start by studying SPNE in ¡ (0;R), the game in which individual
governments simultaneously decide whether to sign Convention R at stage 0 and in which their
idiosyncratic utilities they receive from signing the agreement are identically zero, ® =0.
Proposition 6 In ¡(0; R) there is a unique SPNE in which all N countries sign Convention R
at stage 0.
The proof of Proposition 6 follows along the same lines as the proof of Proposition 2 and is
therefore omitted.
Before turning to the analysis of Convention R when individual countries have idiosyncratic
utilities, it is useful to discuss Proposition 6 and in particular to compare it to Proposition 2.
Proposition 6 statesthat ¡ (0;R) has a unique SPNE in which all countries sign Convention R. In
a similarway, Proposition 2 established that ¡ (0;U (N)) has aunique SPNE in which all countries
sign Convention U (N). This implies that the equilibrium payo¤s under the two Conventions
are identical. But we want to highlight that there is a sense in which the results of the two
Propositions may be regarded as di¤erent and, in particular, that the disposition of countries to
participate in the …ght against international corruption is more robust under Convention R than
under Convention U (N).
Notice that in both cases cooperation is achieved by making sure that each country i receives
the bene…t deriving from the fact that the other countries will prosecute their …rms found to
have bribed the public o¢cial of country i only if country i itself signs the Convention. Under
Convention U (N) this isachieved by making each country pivotal to theConvention entering into
force. UnderConvention R this isachievedby conditioninga country’sbene…ts to itsparticipation
in theConvention. Notice, however, that underConventionU (N) if, for somereason, it is believed
that at least one country will not sign the Convention, then all countries are indi¤erent between
signing or not. Under Convention R the situation is radically di¤erent, because, so long as a
country believes that at least oneother country signs the Convention, it …nds it strictly pro…table
to sign the Convention as well.
Wenow turnto acharacterizationofSPNE underConvention R whenindividual countrieshave
idiosyncratic components in their payo¤ functions. Notice …rst that the results of Propositions
3 and 4 extend to ¡(®; R). In other words, ¡(®; R) always has a SPNE, it may have multiple
SPNE, andin caseofSPNE multiplicity, SPNE with ahigher numberofsignatory countriesPareto
dominate SPNE with a lower number of signatory countries. The proofs are straightforward
extensions of Propositions 3 and 4 and are, therefore, omitted.




® 2 RN : there exists a SPNE of ¡ (®;R) with at least n signatory countries
ª
:
Proposition 7 Consider ¡(®; U (¿)) and ¡(®; R).
1. A(U (¿);n) ½A(R;n) for ¿ · n and ¿ <N:
2. A(U (N);N) = A(R;N)
Proof. Appendix.
Part 1 ofProposition 7statesthat thereexist vectorsofidiosyncraticutilitiessuchthat ¡ (®;R)
has a SPNE with at least ¿ <N signatory countries and such that ¡(®; U (¿)) has no such SPNE,
while the reverse is impossible. To see why this is true, consider the case in which ¡ (®;U (¿))
admits a SPNE with exactly ¿ signatory countries.14 When a signatory country deviates from
such a pro…le it loses its idiosyncratic payo¤ ®i, it saves on the enforcement costs, but it will also
cause the Convention not entering into force and will therefore bear an additional loss deriving
from thereduction in the bene…ts ofprocurement. Consider thesame pro…le under Convention R
and consider a deviation of a signatory country. The deviator loses its idiosyncratic payo¤ ®i, it
saves on theenforcement costs and it also bearsthelossderiving from thereduction in thebene…ts
of procurement. The …rst and the third element are identical under Convention U (¿) as under
Convention R. But the enforcement cost savings are smaller when deviating under Convention R,
because Convention R only requires prosecuting the …rms bribing the public o¢cials of the other
signatory countries, which, in the case contemplated in Part 1, are less than the total number
of countries, N. This means that the incentives to deviate from a pro…le with ¿ < N signatory
countries are fewer under Convention R than under Convention U (¿), and the result follows.15
Part 2 states that set of idiosyncratic utilities such that thereexists a SPNE with N signatory
countries is the same under Convention U (N) as under Convention R. The reason for this is
that with ¿ =N, the reduction of the bene…ts of procurement to a country that deviates from a
pro…le in which N countries sign the convention is the same under U (¿) or under R. Notice that
from Proposition 2, 0 2 A(U (N); N) and from Proposition 6, 0 2 A(R;N). Part 2 generalizes
this result by showing that the set of idiosyncratic utilities that lead to a SPNE with N signatory
countries are the same under U (N) and R.
Our interpretation of the previous results is that there are two reasons why Convention R
may be preferred to Convention U (¿). The …rst is clari…ed by part 1 of Proposition 7 that
suggests that a reciprocal convention ismore likely to bring countriestogether in the …ght against
international corruption than a unilateral convention, because SPNE with any given number of
signatory countries arise with a larger set of parameter constellations in the former than in the
latter case. To see the second reason, notice that part 2 of Proposition 7 does not say that if ¿ is
set high enough a unilateral Convention leads to the same result as a reciprocal convention. The
reason is that part 2 of Proposition 7 does not say that when ® = 2 A(U (N);N) =A(R; N) the
set of SPNE under U(N) or under R are the same. In fact, under U (N) the Convention will
14The analysis of the case in which a SPNE exists with strictly more than ¿ signatory countries proceeds along
very similar lines and is therefore not discussed in the text.
15Notice that Part 1 also claims that if ® 2 A(U (¿);¿), then ® 2 A(R; ¿). This result is also a consequence of
the fact that the incentive to deviate from a pro…le with ¿ signatory countries are larger under U (¿) than under R.
Notice also, that the arguments above do not rule out that for a given ®, Convention R provides enough incentives
for additional countries to sign, and therefore that a SPNE with strictly more than ¿ signatory countries exists.
20not enter into force in any SPNE, but it is possible that a SPNE in which a positive number of
countries signing Convention R exists.
In other words, ourdiscussion aboveclari…es that thereare reasons to believethat a unilateral
convention is risky becauseit may lead to no results in the …ght against international corruption,
especially when the convention sets ambitious goals through a high threshold. By contrast, a
reciprocal convention creates more incentives to participate in the …ght against international
corruption and at the same time allows individual countries to gauge their ambitions through
their equilibrium play.
7 Discussion
This paper proposes a simple theoretical framework to study the enforcement of penalties for
bribing foreign public o¢cials. The participation of foreign …rmsis commonly believed to promote
competition and e¢ciency, but corruption in international business transactions is facilitated by
the fact that it is often very di¢cult or very costly to enforce penalties on foreign …rms and
nationals. We analyze the ways in which international conventions may help resolve this problem
by requiring signatory countries to penalizetheir …rmsthat arefound to havebribedforeignpublic
o¢cials.
We …rst study the incentives to sign international conventions styled along the lines of the
OECD’s “Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public O¢cials in International Business
Transactions.” In this type of convention a signatory country commits to unilaterally penalize
its …rms that are found to have bribed public o¢cials of any foreign countries, regardless of
whether these countries reciprocate or not. We …nd that this type of convention may succeed in
fostering some degree of international cooperation in …ghting corruption, but that it may lead to
no advances when it sets goals which are too ambitious.
Wethenanalyzea di¤erent typeofconvention that includesa reciprocity clausewhich speci…es
that a signatory country commits to penalizing its …rms that are found to have bribed public
o¢cials of foreign signatory countries, i.e., only of reciprocating countries. We show that this has
two important e¤ects. First, it reduces the enforcement costsderiving from signing theconvention
when not all countries sign the convention. Second, it implies a loss for a country that decides
not to sign, because the advantages deriving from the fact that the foreign …rms operating in
the country are subject to corruption penalties accrue only if the country signs the convention.
We show that the ultimate consequences of these e¤ects are that a convention with a reciprocity
provision is more conducive to international cooperation and may therefore lead to substantial
gains in terms of reducing corruption in international business transactions.
For ease of exposition our results are derived for the case in which the probability of a …rm
succeeding in bribing a publico¢cial depends on the bribeit bids, but is independent of the bribes
bid by its competitors. Our results do not depend on this assumption, but can be obtained for
a more general model in which the probability of any one …rm succeeding in bribing the public
o¢cial depends negatively on the bribes bid by its competitors.
Ouranalysisisaninitial step towardstheunderstanding ofinternational conventionsto combat
corruption and it therefore relies on a simple model. We believe that future research may lead to
advances in two di¤erent directions.
First, our model is silent about various additional e¤ects of di¤erent types of conventions.
Because of its reduced risk, for instance, signing Convention R is likely to be perceived as a polit-
ically compelling option. By this, we mean that a government not willing to confront corruption
may …nd it easy to argue that a unilateral convention is likely to generate high costs and very
21limited bene…ts, but that this argument is much less persuasive when waged against a recipro-
cal convention. Because compliance with a reciprocal convention entitles a country to enjoy its
bene…ts, a reciprocal convention, moreover, is also more likely to be accompanied by an e¤ective
surveillance system. Forthesamereason, however, it should not come as a surpriseif an inspector
from a given country had perverse motives in defending that another country is not complying
with the convention.
Second, our model hasmadetwo important assumptions. The…rst isto deal with a symmetric
environment in which, otherthings being equal, …rms from any country have the same probability
of selling in any other country. This ignores the fact that the patterns of international trade
also establish a pattern of corruption trade and leads to a symmetric convention in which all
countries play the same role. A more realistic model would recognize asymmetries and is likely
to prescribe di¤erent behaviors on the part of corruption importers and exporters.16 The second
is that we have dealt with a complete information environment in which all countries know their
payo¤ functions and in particular their idiosyncratic inclinations to sign conventions. A more
realisticenvironment would allow forincompleteinformation and forthepossibility that countries’
inclinations to combat corruption are correlated.
Future research dealing with some of the issues mentioned above is likely to generate substan-
tial progress in ourunderstanding of policiesdesigned to curb corruption in international business
transactions.
16On this issue see Davis (2002) which analyzes the incentives to join ananti-bribery convention of payor countries
(countries where bribing companies are incorporated) and payee countries (countries where bribed public o¢cials
reside).
22A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1



























Given that the second order condition is satis…ed (because ¡2=B <0), the Lemma follows.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2































































































Assuming that the second order condition is satis…ed,
¼ii
¼


















j=1 ¼ji ¸¼, (5) implies that ¹i >0:
23A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Recall that by Lemma 2,
PN
j=1 ¼ji ¸ ¼ for j = 1; :: :;N implies that ¹j > 0, j = 1; :: :; N.
Simple inspection of the objective function of the government of country i = 1;: :: ;N, implies
that in a SPNE
¼ij = 0
for i = 1; :: :;N and j 6= i. We now want to show that (5) is su¢cient to guarantee that in a
SPNE
¼ii =¼





We now compare government i’s utility from setting ¼ii = ¼ or ¼ii = 0 for an arbitrary value of












































argmax Gi(¹;¼00;°) > 0;
¹i2[0;1]
a condition which is satis…ed by Lemma 2. This in turn means that under (5) in a SPNE of ¡,





¼ if j =i
0 if j 6=i
:
The rest of the results stated in Proposition 1 follow by straightforward substitutions.
A.4 Proof of Corollary 1













with the inequality following from that fact that the second order condition for the government’s
problem ensures that the denominator is positive.


















Consider now government i’s best response to a given ¼iF . To show that @Gi=@¼iF > 0, it is
su¢cient to observe that when ¼iF is increased, government i’s utility is higher even if its play is
unchanged.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Since we assume that whenever indi¤erent between signing or not, a country signs the Con-
vention, it is immediateto recognizethat thereis a unique SPNE with either N ¡1 or N countries
signing the agreement. In the following we show that the unique SPNE is for all countries to sign
the agreement.
Consider an arbitrary government i and assume that all the other N ¡1 countries sign the
Convention. We want to show that government i’s best response is to sign the Convention.




























The utility of the government of country i, when it does not sign the Convention is
GNS


























We want to show that GS
i >GNS
i .
Let ¹S¤ denote theSPNE monitoring probability in a signatory country in a subgame starting
after N countries sign the Convention. Let ¹NS¤ denote the SPNE monitoring probability in a
nonsignatory country in a subgame starting after N ¡1 countries sign the Convention. We then
have
GS

















































































with the …rst inequality following from the fact that ¹S¤ is the optimal monitoring probability for


















25A.6 Proof of Lemma 4


































































































































































Note that if N ¸3, Q2 · 0 and DECi(n) is concave in n.
26A.7 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider¡ (®;U (1)). Recall that weassumethat ®1 ¸: :: ¸ ®N and that wheneverindi¤erent
between signing or not, a country signs the Convention. Given this a pro…le in which N0 countries








We …rst want to establish the existence of SPNE. If ®1 < DEC1 (1), there exists a SPNE in
which no country signs the convention. When ®1 ¸ DG1 (1), there are two cases:
1. There exists a country j such that
®i ¸ DECi(j ¡1) for all i <j
®j < DECj (j):
In this casethere exists a SPNE in which only countries i = 1; :: :;j ¡1 sign the convention
2. There exists no country j such that ®j <DECj (j). In this case ®N ¸ DECN (N) and there
exists a SPNE in which all countries sign the convention.
Wenow want to show that ¡(®; U (1)) admitsat most oneSPNE withminº orfewersignatory
countries, but multiple SPNE with minº + 1 or more signatory countries. By de…nition of º,
DECi(n) is increasing for all n ·min º and decreasing for all n¸ min º +1:
Consider …rst n· minº and assume that there is a SPNE in which N0 ·min º countries sign























N00 2 fN0 +1; :: :;minºg.
Consider now n ¸ min º +1. Assume that there is a SPNE in which only N0 ¸ min º +1





















for k ¸ 2. This means that there exists an ® 2 RN such that ¡(®; U (1)) has two SPNE, with
N0 ¸ min º +1 and N00 = N0 +k > min º +1 signatory countries, respectively. Notice that the
condition k ¸2 is necessary, because for k = 1, (14) would contradict (13).
A.8 Proof of Proposition 5
Part 1: Consider a SPNE with n > ¿ signatory countries. Given that deviation payo¤s for
both signatory and nonsignatory countries are identical under U (1) and under U (¿), we get
A(U (1);n) =A(U (¿); n).
Consider now an ® such that a SPNE with ¿ signatory countries under U (1) exists. This im-
pliesthat the deviation payo¤s for all signatory countriesare nonpositive. Forsignatory countries,
i =1;: :: ;¿ we therefore have
DECi(¿) ¡®i ·0: (16)
Recalling that we assume that, if indi¤erent a country signs the Convention, for nonsignatory
countries i =¿ +1; :: :; N we have
®i ¡DECi(¿ +1) <0
Notice that under U (¿) the only di¤erence that arises is that a deviation for a signatory country
also brings about a reduction in the bene…ts of procurement. This implies that (16) is a su¢cient
condition for the deviation payo¤sto signatory countries to be negativeunder U (¿) and therefore
that ®2 A(U (1); ¿) implies that ® 2 A(U (¿);¿)
We now want to show that thereexists ®’s that belong to A(U (¿) ;¿) but not to A(U (1);¿).
Let ®¤ 2 RN be such that country ¿ is exactly indi¤erent between deviating or not from a pro…le
in which ¿ countries sign Convention U (1)
®¤
¿ ¡DECi(¿) = 0
and such that the rest of the signatory countries strictly prefer to sign and nonsignatory countries
prefer not to sign. Consider now ®¤¤ 2 RN such that
®¤¤
i = ®¤
i ¡" for i =1; :: :; ¿
®¤¤
i = ®¤
i ¡± for i =¿ +1; :: :; N:
Consider ± > 0 such that for all " 2 (0;±), ®¤¤ = 2 A(U(1); ¿). Given that a signatory country’s
deviation underU(¿) also leadsto areductionin thebene…tsofprocurement, a signatory country’s
deviation payo¤ is lower and this implies that there exist " 2 (0; ±) such that ®¤¤ 2 A(U(¿); ¿).
Part 2: Consider an ® such that ®¿¡1 is su¢ciently large and ®¿ is su¢ciently small. Then,
®2 A(U (1);1) but ® = 2 A(U(¿); ¿), for all ¿ >1.17
17In fact notice that ® 2 A(U (¿ ¡1); ¿ ¡ 1) but ® = 2 A(U (¿);¿):
28A.9 Proof of Proposition 7
Part 1: Considera pro…le with ¿ signatory countries and supposeit may be part of a SPNE of
U (¿). This implies that for every signatory country i =1; :: :; ¿, DECi(¿)¡®i has to be at least
as large as the reduction of the bene…ts of procurement which takes place because a country’s
unilateral deviation issu¢cient for the Conventionnot entering into force. Considernow thesame
pro…le under Convention R. If a signatory country deviates from such a pro…le it will also lose ®i
and will su¤er a reduction in thebene…ts of procurement., so that the deviation payo¤is thesame
as with U (¿). But because, when ¿ < N, the enforcement costs under R are smaller than under
U (¿), the equilibrium payo¤ under R is larger. This means that if a signatory country does not
…nd it pro…table to deviate from a pro…le with ¿ signatory country under U (¿), it will also …nd
it pro…table not to deviate under R. This implies that under R there exists a SPNE with either
¿ or strictly more than ¿ signatory countries.
In the case of n > ¿ signatory countries the argument is reinforced by the fact that under
U (¿) a unilateral deviation leaves thebene…ts of procurement to thedeviator una¤ected, whereas
under R a deviation for a signatory country leads to a reduction in the bene…ts of procurement
and a deviation for a nonsignatory country leads to a gain in the bene…ts of procurement.
This shows that for ¿ < N and n ¸¿, ® 2 A(U (¿);n) implies that ® 2 A(R; n).
We now want to show that for ¿ < N and n ¸ ¿, there exist an ® 2 RN such that ® = 2
A(U (¿); n) and ® 2 A (R; n).
Let ®¤ 2 RN be such that country ¿ is exactly indi¤erent between deviating or not from a
pro…leinwhich ¿ countries sign Convention U (¿) and such that therest ofthesignatory countries
strictly prefer to sign and nonsignatory countries prefer not to sign.
Consider now ®¤¤ 2 RN such that
®¤¤
i = ®¤
i ¡" for i =1; :: :; ¿
®¤¤
i = ®¤
i ¡± for i =¿ +1; :: :; N:
Consider ± > 0 such that for all " 2 (0; ±), ®¤¤ = 2 A(U (¿);¿). Given that a signatory country’s
enforcement costs under R are lower than under U (¿), a signatory country’s deviation payo¤ is
lower and this implies that there exist " 2 (0; ±) such that ®¤¤ 2 A(R;¿). In the case of n > ¿
signatory countries, the argument is reinforced by the fact that under U (¿) a unilateral deviation
leaves the bene…ts of procurement to the deviator una¤ected, whereas under R a deviation for
a signatory country leads to a reduction in the bene…ts of procurement and a deviation for a
nonsignatory country leads to a gain in the bene…ts of procurement.
Part 2: Consider a pro…le in which all N countries sign Convention U (N) or Convention R,
respectively. Notice that the payo¤s associated with this pro…le in ¡(®; U (N)) and ¡(®; R) are
identical and so are the deviation payo¤s. This implies that A(U (N); N) =A(R;N).
B An Alternative Model of Bribing
The purpose of this appendix is to verify that the main properties of the model of bribing we
haveproposed hold under a di¤erent speci…cation oftheprobability ofa …rm succeeding in bribing
the public o¢cial of a given country. We consider a case in which the probability of winning the
auctionisincreasing inits own bribeand increasing in thedi¤erencebetween itsownbribeand the
averagebribe. Thisimplies the probability of succeeding in bribing thepublic o¢cial isdecreasing
in the bribes bid by competing …rms. This creates a strategic complementarity that implies that
if a …rm bids a higher bribe, all its opponents also …nd it optimal to bid higher bribes. We show
29that the properties of the bidding game that were established in Corollary 1 hold under this new
speci…cation and we therefore conclude that the analysis of international conventions would be
qualitatively unchanged under this alternative speci…cation.
Assume that each …rm sets a nonnegativebribe and that the probability that a corrupt trans-
action takes place between …rm (i;j) (incorporated in country i and operating in country j) and











with °ij 2 [0;1], B > 0, an exogenous parameter that measures public o¢cials’ propensity to
corruption and l 2 [0;1). Notice that °ij is increasing in ¯ij and decreasing in B and ¯zj, z 6=i.
Firm (i; j) is required to pay the bribe it o¤ered, ¯ij, only if it wins the auction. Under this
probabilistic auction a …rm that bids a higher bribe has a higher probability of corrupting the







have a strictly positive probability to succeed in bribing the public o¢cial. When all …rms have
a strictly positive probability of bribing the public o¢cial of the country in which they operate,




















In the following we will restrict attention to situations in which each …rm has a strictly positive
probability of bribing the public o¢cial of the country in which it operates and in which the





We now want to characterize the bribes in the equilibrium of the subgame that starts at
the beginning of stage 3, i.e., after governments have set penalties and monitoring probabilities.
In particular, we want to characterize how equilibrium bids and the resulting probabilities of
corruption depend on monitoring probabilities and penalties. In other words, we want to perform
the same comparative statics exercises that were performed in Corollary 1 and that lie at the
heart of the results of the paper.

















Given that the model in the paper corresponds to the casein which l =0, in the following wewill
focus on the case l 2 (0; 1). We …nd it convenient to divide the previous expression by l and let































Notice that because the …rst order condition is linear in the bribes, an equilibrium of the bribe
setting game of stage 3 has to be symmetric, i.e., such that all …rms that are penalized by their
home country if found to have bribed the public o¢cial of country j, bid ¯Pj and all remaining
…rms (who are not penalized) bid ¯NPj. We denote by nj the number of countries that penalize
























































From (22) and (23) one can see that the equilibrium bribes are decreasing in ¹j , ¼ and nj.
From (22) and (23) we can also compute the expected corruption of individual …rms when they




























































is increasing in nj. The probability of corruption in country j can then

















and is therefore decreasing in nj.
We now want to analyze when an increasein nj causesthe government of country j to increase




in a subgame of ¡ starting at stage 2. In particular we want to investigate how monitoring
probabilities depend on nj. Notice that because the monitoring probability set by country j in
31stage 2 is independent of the probabilities set by the other countries, each government has a
dominant strategy in stage 2. We makeuse of the following result of Edlin and Shannon (1998),18
which allows us to obtain strictly monotonic comparative statics results for interior solutions
without making further assumptions on the concavity of problem.
Theorem 8 (Edlin and Shannon, 1998) Let S ½<; f : < £< ! <; y¤ 2 argmaxy2S f(y; t¤)
and y0 2 argmaxy2S f(y; t0): Suppose that f is C1 and has increasing marginal returns, and that
y¤ 2 intS . Then y0 > y¤ if t0 >t¤, and y0 <y¤ if t0 <t¤:











































































































































































18Edlin, A. and C. Shannon (1998) “Strict Monotonicity in Comparative Statics,” Journal of Economic Theory,
Vol. 81, pp. 201-219.
32In other words, when condition (26) holds, from Theorem 8, ¹j, the monitoring probability set
by country j in stage 2 is increasing in nj, the number of countries which in stage 1 set a penalty


















which can be veri…ed to hold for h >2.





















It is also possible to show that when nj increases the equilibrium utility of country j increases.
To see this, it is su¢cient to show that country j’s utility increases even if it does not modify

















and that (27) implies (28).
33References
[1] Burns, J. (2002) “Laws fail to halt international business bribery”, Financial Times, October
15, 2002, page 12.
[2] Celentani, M. and J.-J. Ganuza (2002) “Corruption and competition in procurement”, Euro-
pean Economic Review, 46, 1273-1303.
[3] Davis, K.E. (2002) “Self-interest and altruism in the deterrence of transnational bribery,”
American Law and Economics Review, 4(2), 314-340.
[4] Eigen, P. (2002) “Multinationals’ bribery goes unpunished”, International Herald Tribune,
November 12, 2002, page 6
[5] La¤ont, J.-J. and T. N’Guessan(1999) “Competitionandcorruption inan agency relationship”
Journal of Development Economics 60, 271-295.
[6] La¤ont, J.-J. and J. Tirole (1991) “Auction design and favoritism” International Journal of
Industrial Organization 9, 9-42.
[7] The Economist (2002) “The short arm of the law”, March 2, 2002, 63-65.
34